Abstract. This paper presents a new security notion, called perfect keyword privacy (PKP), for non-interactive public-key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) [5] . Although the conventional security notion for PEKS guarantees that a searchable ciphertext leaks no information about keywords, it gives no guarantee concerning leakage of a keyword from the trapdoor. PKP is a notion for overcoming this fatal deficiency. Since the trapdoor has verification functionality, the popular concept of "indistinguishability" is inadequate for capturing the notion of keyword privacy from the trapdoor. Hence, our formalization of PKP depends on the idea of formalizing a perfectly one-way hash function [10, 11] . We also present IND-PKP security as a useful notion for showing that a given PEKS scheme has PKP. Furthermore, we present PKP+ and IND-PKP+ as enhanced notions of PKP and IND-PKP, respectively. Finally, we present several instances of an IND-PKP or IND-PKP+ secure PEKS scheme, in either the random oracle model or the standard model.
Introduction
Much attention has been paid to encryption systems that go beyond traditional public-key encryption (PKE) systems, such as identity-based encryption (IBE) [6, 13, 17] , public-key searchable encryption [5, 19] , attribute-based encryption (ABE) [16] , and functional encryption (FE) [7] . This paper deals with noninteractive public-key encryption with keyword search (PEKS), which is first presented in [5] . The PEKS provides a simple but useful mechanism to cryptographically protect data while keeping it available for search. For example, Alice can generate a searchable ciphertext corresponding to her selected keyword using Bob's public key. She then stores the ciphertext to a server. Bob can generate another key, called a trapdoor, corresponding to his selected keyword by using own secret key. Bob then sends the trapdoor to the server. The server can test whether or not the keywords corresponding to the ciphertext and the trapdoor are identical, and Bob can receive the ciphertext from the server only when the test is passed. In an email system, the server could be a gateway that forwards emails from Alice to Bob's portable terminal, depending on his selected keywords, such as "urgent" or "the next business meeting".
The conventional security for PEKS, called IND-PEKS-CKA security (cf. Definition 2), requires that the searchable ciphertext does not leak any information about the keyword. This security, however, gives no guarantee about leakage of the keyword from the trapdoor. Indeed, there exist PEKS schemes, such FE. They showed that the natural indistinguishability game-based definition is inadequate for certain functionalities since trivially insecure constructions may satisfy it. They hence presented a simulation-based security in which one getting the secret key reveals no information other than the result of decryption when the ciphertext is given. However, although simulation-based security can be achieved in the random oracle model, for a quite simple functionality (the functionality corresponding to IBE), it cannot be achieved even in the non-programmable random oracle model. Since PEKS can also be considered as a special case of FE, the security in [7] is applicable to PEKS. Both game-based security and simulation-based security, however, have the goal of achieving privacy of a keyword from a ciphertext, and they give no guarantee concerning keyword leakage from a trapdoor.
Preliminaries
We say that a function f : N → [0, 1] is negligible if, for every constant c > 0, there exists an integer k c such that f (k) ≤ k −c for all k ≥ k c . For a group G, G * denotes a set G\{1 G }, where 1 G is an identity element of G. For a finite set S, x ← S denotes the operation of picking an element uniformly from S. We use x, x ′ ← S as shorthand for x ← S ; x ′ ← S. If A is a probabilistic algorithm, then y ← A(x 1 , x 2 , . . . ; r) is the result of running A on inputs x 1 , x 2 , . . . and coins r. We let y ← A(x 1 , x 2 , . . . ) denote the experiment of picking r at random and letting y to be A(x 1 
* . A probability ensemble is a sequence X = {X k } k∈N of random variables X k . We say that X is well-spread if ||X k || is negligible in k. The d-composite bilinear group generator G is a PPT algorithm that takes a security parameter k as input and outputs (p 1 , . . . , p d , G, G T , e), where p i are prime numbers with p i > 2 k , G and G T are multiplicative cyclic groups with order N = ∏ d i=1 p i , and e is a map from G × G to G T , called a bilinear map, with the following properties:
1. Computable: There is an efficient algorithm to compute e(g, h) for any g, h ∈ G. 2. Bilinear: e(g x , g y ) = e(g, g) xy for any g ∈ G and any x, y ∈ Z N . 3. Non-degenerate: If g is a generator of G then e(g, g) is a generator of G T .
In particular, the 1-composite bilinear group generator is simply called a bilinear group generator. For an integer m dividing N , G m denotes the subgroup of G with order m. Then, e(x, y) = 1 G for any x ∈ G m and any y ∈ G n when m and n are coprime. This is called the "orthogonality property".
Definition 1.
A non-interactive public-key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) scheme consists of the following polynomial-time randomized algorithms:
Takes a security parameter k, and generates a public/secret key pair (P K, SK). Here, the keys include the information about the keyword space KSP k . -Td(SK, w): For SK and a keyword w ∈ KSP k , produces a trapdoor T w . -PEKS(P K, w): For P K and w ∈ KSP k , produces a searchable ciphertext C w of w.
Otherwise, outputs 0 with an overwhelming probability 1 .
The security of PEKS is defined against an active attacker who is able to obtain a trapdoor T w for any keyword w of his choice, to ensure that a PEKS(P K, w) does not reveal any information about w unless T w is available [5] .
IND-PEKS-CKA security. Let Π = (KG, Td, PEKS, Test) be a PEKS scheme, and let A = (A 1 , A 2 ) be a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary. We then consider the following experiment.
Experiment Exp
Here, w 0 , w 1 ∈ KSP k and w 0 ̸ = w 1 , σ is a string representing the configuration of A 1 at its quitting point, and A is prohibited from asking for the trapdoors w 0 or w 1 . The advantage of A in the above experiment is defined as 
Perfect keyword privacy

Definition
The IND-PEKS-CKA security (in Definition 2) guarantees the privacy of the keyword from a searchable ciphertext. It does not, however, guarantee any security concerning leakage of the keyword from the trapdoor. For example, in [1] , a PEKS scheme with statistical consistency is presented and shown to be IND-PEKS-CKA secure under the BDH assumption. That scheme is designed, however, so that the trapdoor includes the keyword itself. To overcome this deficiency, we present a new security notion, perfect keyword privacy (briefly, PKP), for a PEKS to ensure the privacy of the keyword from both the trapdoor and the searchable ciphertext. In this section, we present a formal definition of PKP. In formulating security against information leakage, the natural, popular concept that comes to mind is "indistinguishability". We first explain why indistinguishability is inadequate for defining PKP. We now consider the following game based on indistinguishability.
1. For (P K, SK) ← KG(1 k ), the adversary receives the public key P K and is allowed to access to the trapdoor oracle Td(SK, ·). 2. In the challenge phase, the adversary submits two keywords, w 0 , w 1 , and receives a target trapdoor T w b = Td(SK, w b ) for a randomly chosen b ∈ {0, 1}. The adversary can continuously make queries to the trapdoor oracle Td(SK, ·), except for querying w 0 or w 1 . 3. In the guess phase, the adversary finally outputs b ′ ∈ {0, 1} as its guess for b.
It is then required that no PPT adversary can guess the challenge bit b with a non-negligible advantage. There exists an adversary, however, that can guess b with an overwhelming probability in the above game. After receiving the trapdoor T w b in Step 2, the adversary computes C wi = PEKS(P K, w i ) for each i = 0, 1 and outputs
Then, from the consistency of PEKS, the probability Pr[b = b ′ ] is overwhelming. Our formalization of PKP depends on an idea of formalizing a POWHF [10, 11] . Informally, we say that a PEKS scheme has PKP if there is no efficient way to guess the keyword w from the given trapdoor T w and ciphertext C w other than the "select and test" method; in other words, the adversary selects a keyword w ′ in an arbitrary manner and tests whether Test(T w , PEKS(P K, w ′ )) = 1 holds. If the test is passed, the adversary decides that w = w ′ . In our definition, the "select and test" method is formalized by an oracle O w , called a test oracle, in the ideal system: for a query (keyword) w ′ , O w responds with 1 if w = w ′ ; otherwise, it responds with 0. Note that one may think that the oracle O w should be defined so that it outputs 0 with an overwhelming probability when w ̸ = w ′ because Definition 1 adopts computational consistency. It can easily be shown, however, that this difference does not affect Definition 3.
Perfect keyword privacy. Let Π = (KG, Td, PEKS, Test) be a PEKS scheme. Let X = {X k } k∈N be a probability ensemble such that [X k ] = KSP k . From now on, unless otherwise indicated, we assume that X is well-spread and independent from key generation (cf. Remarks 1 and 2). X determines the distribution of keywords; that is, when the security parameter k is given, the keyword w is given as a random sample from X k . Let P = {P k } k∈N be a predicate family, where P k is an efficiently computable predicate over [X k ]. Let A and B be PPT algorithms. We then define the following experiments. See Section 2 for other notations and conventions.
Experiment Exp
else return 0.
Definition 3.
We say that a PEKS scheme Π has perfect keyword privacy (PKP) with respect to X if for any P and A, there exists a negligible function negl and B such that
for all k ∈ N. We also say that Π has PKP if it has PKP with respect to any X . Remark 1. In Definition 3, the probability ensemble X is given independently from the key generation of the PEKS scheme. This setting is very significant for obtaining a useful notion, IND-PKP security, to achieve PKP (see the proof of Theorem 1). From a practical viewpoint, we think that this is a natural setting in the real world. Generally, public keys are not used as keywords because they are large, meaningless phrases, whereas other identifiers, such as a user's name and email address, are usually used to designate a person.
Remark 2. Definition 3 is meaningful even if X is not well-spread. However, without loss of generality, we can assume that the probability ensemble X is well-spread when defining the privacy of the keyword from the trapdoor. As described at the beginning of this section, if the trapdoor is given, the adversary can always verify whether it corresponds to his own chosen keyword. From this fact, in (1) we can exclude the case of choosing w
is non-negligible. Notice that the number of keywords appearing with a nonnegligible probability is polynomially bounded in k.
Remark 3. In Definition 3, only a single tuple of the trapdoor and ciphertext is given to the adversary A. In Section 3.2, we present a notion, IND-PKP security, and use it to show that a given PEKS scheme has PKP. From a hybrid argument [2] , we can show that (single-target) IND-PKP security implies multi-target IND-PKP security. Thus, IND-PKP security implies multi-target PKP.
Remark 4.
Concerning the privacy of a keyword from only the searchable ciphertext, IND-PEKS-CKA security gives strictly stronger security than that of PKP. In Remark 7, we demonstrate this by presenting a PEKS scheme that is IND-PKP secure (cf. Section 3.2) but not IND-PEKS-CKA secure. On the other hand, there exist PEKS schemes, such as the scheme in [1] described above, that are IND-PEKS-CKA secure but do not have PKP. Thus, PKP is a separate security notion from IND-PEKS-CKA security; that is, PKP and IND-PEKS-CKA security are independent of each other. Hence, for higher security in a PEKS system, both IND-PEKS-CKA security and PKP are required. Note that strictly speaking, the above results on separation and comparison are true under some computational complexity assumptions because they are required for achieving the securities of the instances.
We expect that the idea of PKP will be applied in FE systems to ensure the privacy of a key from a secret key (see [7] for the detail of FE); since FE is a generalized concept of many other primitives, such as IBE, PE, and ABE, this idea is also applicable to those primitives. Informally, we say that an FE scheme for a functionality F over (K, X) has perfect key privacy if a secret key sk k corresponding to the key k ∈ K leaks no information about k, beyond the information obtained from the oracle O F (k,·) , where for the query
gives only trivial information 2 , like O x in PEKS, then this notion will give meaningful security in an FE system. We leave a detailed, formal discussion to subsequent works.
How to achieve PKP
In this section, we present a useful notion, called IND-PKP security, to show that a given PEKS scheme has PKP. The IND-PKP security can be defined in a game-based manner, whereas we defined PKP above in a simulation-based manner. The IND-PKP security can be regarded as a strictly stronger notion than PKP from the viewpoint of the strength relation between the cryptographic assumptions for achieving these securities (cf. Remark 6).
IND-PKP security. Let X = {X k } k∈N be a probability ensemble, and let Π = (KG, Td, PEKS, Test) be a PEKS scheme. Let A be a PPT algorithm, called IND-PKP adversary. We then define the following experiment (cf. Remark 3).
Experiment Exp ind-pkp
The advantage of A in the above experiment is defined as
and b ∈ {0, 1} is called a challenge bit. The proof of Theorem1 is given in Appendix A.
Additional notions
In Section 4.3, we present an IND-PKP secure PEKS system in which the trapdoor is generated in a deterministic manner. In this system, when two trapdoors are given under the same secret key, one can easily guess whether they correspond to the same keyword. Thus, IND-PKP security cannot assure "search pattern privacy", in general. In this section, we address this issue.
Search pattern privacy. Let X = {X k } k∈N be a probability ensemble, and let Π = (KG, Td, PEKS, Test) be a PEKS scheme. Let A be a PPT algorithm, called a SPP adversary. We then define the following experiment.
and b ∈ {0, 1} is called a challenge bit. Remark 5. In Definition 5, it is essential that the adversary cannot see the ciphertexts C w0 and C w1 . If either of these is given, the adversary can easily guess b by running the test algorithm. Thus, in a real system, SPP is meaningful in a situation in which there is no ciphertext corresponding to the search keyword (although the searcher has multiple trapdoors corresponding to the underlying keyword). In our definition of SPP, the adversary is not allowed to choose the keywords w 0 , w 1 . This is because we regard SPP as an additional notion for PKP to strengthen the privacy of keywords.
PEKS schemes with perfect keyword privacy
As described in Remark 4, concerning the privacy of a keyword from only a searchable ciphertext, IND-PKP security ensures strictly weaker security than that of IND-PEKS-CKA security. Therefore, for higher security in PEKS, we present several instances of a PEKS scheme that is IND-PKP secure or IND-PKP+ secure, in addition to being IND-PEKS-CKA secure. As much as we possible, we looked for appropriate instances in existing schemes and modified them if necessary.
General methodology
Before giving concrete instances, we describe a general methodology for achieving IND-PKP security in PEKS schemes. We first introduce the notion of a secure injective-function generator. 
is negligible.
An example of a secure injective-function generator is given in Section 4.2. Next, we describe how to convert a PEKS scheme into an IND-PKP secure PEKS scheme by using a secure injective-function generator. The essential point of the conversion is that the secure function generator yields a fresh injective function for each user, and the trapdoor and ciphertext are created from the keyword's function value. Let Π = (KG, Td, PEKS, Test) be a PEKS scheme, and let (I, G) be an injective-function generator such that for λ k ← I(1 k ), G(λ k ) outputs an injective function from KSP k to KSP k . We then define a PEKS scheme Π * = (KG * , Td * , PEKS * , Test * ) as follows.
, and π ← G(λ k ), where λ k is a common parameter for all users in this system.
Theorem 2.
In the PEKS scheme Π * , we have the following results.
The proof of Theorem 2 is given in Appendix B. The above methodology is simple and useful although some additional assumption may be required for secure function generator. This methodology however cannot guarantee SPP in Π * . The brute force approach (under a constraint) for obtaining an IND-PKP+ secure PEKS scheme Π * by using a secure injective-function generator (I, G) is as follows.
, and π 1 , . . . , π n ← G(λ k ). Td * (SK, w) has a counter, and it outputs T * w = T πi(w) if this is the i-th execution for the same keyword w. PEKS * (P K, w) outputs C * w = (C πi(w) ) 1≤i≤n . It can readily be shown that if (I, G) is a secure injective-function generator and the adversary is restricted to making at most n trapdoor queries to the same keyword, then Π * is IND-PKP+ secure. We do not know of a general methodology for obtaining an IND-PKP+ secure PEKS scheme without restriction. This problem remains open. Note that obviously, we can obtain a similar result to Theorem 2 when applying an RO generator (i.e., π is an RO in the above Π * ) instead of a secure injective-function generator (cf. Proposition 5).
Instance 1
In this section, we present a concrete instance of a PEKS scheme that can be obtained by the methodology described in Section 4.1. This instance is based on the Gentry IBE scheme [15] and the conversion [1] from the IBE scheme to the PEKS scheme. The resulting scheme is both IND-PKP and IND-PEKS-CKA secure in the standard model. Let G be a bilinear group generator. We define an injective function generator (G, G) as follows:
p at random and outputs a function π such that π(x) = ξ x for x ∈ Z p . Since ξ is a primitive element, π is injective. The following assumption can be seen as a variant of the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption.
Assumption I We say that G satisfies Assumption I if for any well-spread probability ensemble
X = {X k } k∈N with [X k ] ⊆ Z p ,
and any PPT algorithm B,
is negligible, where PRIM(p) is a set of all primitive elements in Z p .
From the definitions, the following proposition is clear.
Proposition 1. If G satisfies Assumption I, then (G, G) is secure.
Let (G, G) be the injective-function generator mentioned above. We then define the PEKS scheme Π 1 = (KG, Td, PEKS, Test) as follows.
) and SK = α, and output (P K, SK), where (I, g) are common parameters for all users in this system. -Td(SK, w): To generate a trapdoor for a keyword w ∈ Z p under the secret key SK, pick a random r w ∈ Z p and output T w = (r w , h w = (hg −rw ) 1 α−π(w) ). Note that the same r w is used for the same keyword w.
-PEKS(P K, w): To encrypt a keyword w under the public key P K, pick random s ∈ Z p and R ∈ G T , and output C w = (R, 
Instance 2
In this section, we present an efficient PEKS scheme that is IND-PKP and IND-PEKS-CKA secure in the RO model, without depending on a secure injectivefunction generator in its construction. To achieve IND-PKP security, this instance requires no cryptographic assumption beyond those for achieving IND-PEKS-CKA security. This scheme is based on the PEKS scheme proposed in [5] , with slight modification. Let G be a bilinear group generator. We begin by describing the PEKS scheme Π 2 = (KG, Td, PEKS, Test) associated with G.
, and select a ∈ Z p and g ∈ G * (i.e., g is a generator of G) at random. Set P K = (p, g, G, G 1 , e, g, , and (p, G, G 1 , e, g, H 1 , H 2 ) are common parameters for all users in this system, and output (P K, SK). -Td(SK, w): As a trapdoor for a keyword w ∈ {0, 1} * under the secret key
To encrypt a keyword w under the public key P K, pick a random r ∈ Z p and output
Using the notation in the description of Td and PEKS, if H 2 (e(T w , C 1 )) = C 2 , then output 1; otherwise, output 0.
The consistency of the above PEKS scheme is shown in [1] . As compared to the original scheme, the input to H 1 includes a public key in Π 2 . This modification does not collapse the IND-PEKS-CKA security of the scheme because it can be seen as the original PEKS scheme with a special keyword form. Therefore, like the original scheme, this scheme can be shown IND-PEKS-CKA secure in the RO model under the BDH assumption [5] . Interestingly, IND-PKP security of Π 2 can be shown only under the RO assumption (i.e., without a computational assumption). 
The proof of Proposition 2 is given in Appendix C.
Remark 6. From Definition 3, the original PEKS scheme in [5] is shown directly to has a PKP under the RO assumption. This is because in the trapdoor, the keyword is hidden by the RO H 1 , and the ciphertexts can be created from the trapdoor. However, it will be impossible to show the IND-PKP security of this scheme only under the RO assumption. If the DDH assumption (on G) is added, then the scheme is shown to be IND-PKP secure. In this sense, IND-PKP security can be regarded as a strictly stronger notion than PKP. On the other hand, if H 1 and H 2 are freshly chosen in each key generation (not used as common parameters), then the original scheme is shown to be IND-PKP secure only under the RO assumption.
Instance 3
As described in Section 3.1, achievement of both IND-PEKS-CKA and IND-PKP+ securities can be considered as the highest security in a PEKS system. Unfortunately, we could not find an appropriate instance within any existing schemes (even allowing for slight modification). We then present a new PEKS scheme that is IND-PKP+ and IND-PEKS-CKA secure in the RO model. Let G 3 be a 3-composite bilinear group generator. We begin by describing the PEKS scheme Π 3 = (KG, Td, PEKS, Test) associated with G 3 .
where H is a hash function from {0, 1} * to G p1 , and output (P K, SK). -Td(SK, w): To generate a trapdoor of a keyword w ∈ {0, 1} * under the secret key SK, pick s ∈ Z p1 and R 3 , S 3 ∈ G p3 at random, and output
To encrypt a keyword w under the public key P K, pick r ∈ Z N and Y 2 , Z 2 ∈ G p2 at random, and output
Using the notation in the description of Td and PEKS, if e(T 1 , C 2 ) = e(T 2 , C 1 ), then output 1; otherwise, output 0.
From the orthogonality property, the completeness and consistency of Π 3 can readily be verified. To show the security of Π 3 , we introduce the following assumptions.
Assumption II We say that G 3 satisfies Assumption II if for any PPT algorithm B,
Assumption III We say that G 3 satisfies Assumption III if for any PPT algorithm B,
Assumption IV We say that G 3 satisfies Assumption IV if for any PPT algorithm B,
It can readily be shown that if G 3 satisfies Assumption II then it also satisfies the DDH assumption over (G T ) p1 . Thus, Assumption II is a stronger assumption than the DDH assumption over (G T ) p1 . Assumption IV is presented to explain the position of Assumption III but with a simpler representation. Proposition 3 says that Assumption III is a stronger assumption than Assumption IV its proof is straightforward and left to the reader. 
Proposition 4.
Suppose that H is an RO. For any probability ensemble X = {X k } k∈N and any SPP adversary A that makes at most q H (k) queries to H and at most q t (k) trapdoor queries when the security parameter k is given, there exists a PPT algorithm B such that 
The proofs of Propositions 4, 5, and 6 are given in Appendixes D, E, and F respectively. The open problem is to construct a PEKS scheme that is IND-PKP+ secure and IND-PEKS-CKA secure, either in the standard model or the RO model, under reasonable assumptions.
Remark 7.
We now consider a PEKS scheme that is identical with Π 3 except that the searchable ciphertext of w is given by
. From a similar discussion to that for Proposition 5, it can be shown that this PEKS scheme is IND-PKP secure; however, it is not IND-PEKS-CKA secure. This is because for a given target ciphertext C w b = (C 1 , C 2 ), an adversary can easily guess the challenge bit b by outputting b ′ ∈ {0, 1} such that e(g, C 2 ) = e(C 1 , H(w b ′ ) ). This instance demonstrates the separation between the IND-PKP and IND-PEKS-CKA securities.
Postscript
We have introduced new security notions for PEKS systems, namely PKP, IND-PKP, PKP+, and IND-PKP+, which take account of the privacy of a keyword from a trapdoor. We have also showed that these notions ensure strictly weaker security with respect to keyword leakage from only the ciphertext, as compared to IND-PEKS-CKA security. Accordingly, for achieving higher security in PEKS, we have presented several instances of a PEKS scheme that is IND-PKP or IND-PKP+ secure, in addition to being IND-PEKS-CKA secure. From a practical viewpoint, however, we have no corroboration that either IND-PKP or IND-PKP+ security is insufficient to ensure the privacy of a keyword from a ciphertext. We expect that the underlying notion and PRIV security [3] give equal security levels, because they are defined for the situation in which the target keywords are chosen from a well-spread distribution, and the (guessing) adversary cannot see them. We are sure that it is easier to design efficient IND-PKP (or IND-PKP+) secure PEKS schemes than it is to design efficient IND-PEKS-CKA
A Proof of Theorem 1
Let X = {X k } k∈N be a well-spread probability ensemble. We show that if the PEKS scheme Π is IND-PKP secure with respect to X , then it has PKP with respect to X . For an IND-PKP adversary A, we define
A,Π,X (k) = Pr 
A,Π,X (k) .
We now suppose that Π does not have PKP with respect to X = {X k } k∈N . Then from Definition 3, there exists a predicate family P = {P k } k∈N and a PPT algorithm B such that for any PPT algorithm C, ρ(k) = Pr 
is non-negligible. We now consider a PPT algorithm C (in the ideal system) that works as follows:
1. Select a random sample w ′ ← X k and make a trapdoor query w ′ to obtain the trapdoor T w ′ . Generate a searchable ciphertext of w ′ by C w ′ ← PEKS(P K, w ′ ). 
Let Pr 
A * ,Π,X (k) and
A * ,Π,X (k).
From (2), (6), and (7), we finally have
A * ,Π,X (k) − ρ 
